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Abstract: C arrutliers’ argum ents depend  on a tenuous interpretation
ol eases lrom  the eonlabulatiou literature. Specifically, C arrutliers 
maintains that cases ol' confabulation are “subjectively 
indistinguishable" lrom  cases ol' alleged introspection. However, in 
typical cases o l'eoulabulatiou, the sell'-attributious are characterized by- 
low confidence, in contrast to cases ol alleged introspection.
Wliat is confabulation? Carrutliers' central argument liinees 011D D
this notion, so we need to get clear 011 what lie lias in mind. Car­
rutliers doesn't present an explicit characterization, but the 
overall discussion suggests that the relevant confabulations areDD
a class of first-person mental state attributions that are generated 
bv an “interpretative" process, as opposed to an “introspective" 
process. Bv “interpretative," Carrutliers means any process 
“that accesses information about the subject's current circum­
stances, or the subject's current or recent behavior, as well as 
any other information about the subject's current or recent 
mental life" (sect. 1.4, para. 3). This characterization seems too 
broad because introspection itself is supposed to be a process 
that accesses information about the subject's current mental 
life. But Carrutliers means to count as interpretative only those 
processes that do not employ any “direct" access or any mechan­
ism specifically dedicated to detecting one's current mental 
states.
On Carrutliers' view, all attributions of prepositional attitude 
events are, in fact, interpretative. So wliat is the relation 
between “confabulation" and “interpretation"? Here are several 
different possibilities:
1. Confabulations include till self-attributions that result from 
interpretation.
2. Confabulations include ail false self-attributions that result 
from interpretation, and accurate interpretative self-ascriptions 
do not count as confabulatory.
3. Confabulations include only a proper subset of false self­
attributions resulting from interpretation.
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C om m entary/Carm thers: IIow  we know our own minds
We doubt that Carrutliers lias possibility 1 in mind, as this would 
mean that one is confabulating even when one quite consciously 
uses interpretative processes to discern one's past mental states. 
If Carrutliers lias option 3 in mind, then we need to know much 
more about what distinguishes the proper subset. As a result, we 
proceed 011 the assumption that possibility 2 captures what Car­
rutliers lias in mind.
Our experience with identifying our own current mental states 
is characteristically quick, accurate, and confident. By contrast, 
when it comes to attributing mental states to others, our attribu­
tions seem much slower, more accident prone, and unsure. This 
subjective difference is thought to provide prima facie evidence 
that we have (11011-interpretative) introspective access to our 
own mental states. Carrutliers attempts to defeat this prima 
facie consideration by proclaiming that confabulated reports 
are subjectively indistinguishable from cases of alleged introspec­
tion. People confabulate attributions of their own propositional 
attitude events “while being under the impression that they are 
introspecting’ (sect. 6, para. 1). Thus, we have 110 reason to 
think that canonical cases of “introspection'’ differ from confabu­
lation in this respect (i.e., that we are interpreting in the latter 
case but not the former). Carrutliers goes 011 to argue that 
since there is 110 other positive reason to believe in the reality 
of introspection for the attitudes, the best explanation is that all 
self-attribution (confabulation and alleged introspection) is sub­
served by the same kinds of processes: that is, interpretative ones.
Carrutliers' argument depends 011 the claim that people confa­
bulate attributions of propositional attitudes while being under 
the impression that they are introspecting. But we are given 110 
evidence that this lias been systematically investigated. Certainly 
110 one lias ever asked participants in these cases whether they 
think they are introspecting or interpreting. Without some 
more direct evidence, Carrutliers is not warranted in claiming 
that when people confabulate they are often “under the 
impression that they are introspecting.'’
A closer look at the confabulation cases gives further reason to 
doubt the argument. The evidence 011 confabulation cited by 
Carrutliers is all anecdotal, but even the anecdotes are illuminat­
ing if one looks at the behavior a bit more closely. For we find that 
across many different paradigms in which people confabulate, 
the confabulations are not reported with a sense of “obviousness 
and immediacy.'’ Consider the following examples:
a. I11 a classic misattribution study, subjects took more shock 
because they thought a pill caused their symptoms. I11 a debrief­
ing procedure subjects were asked, “I noticed you took more 
shock than average. Why do you suppose you did?" Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977) present one instance of confabulation and 
claim it as typical. The confabulation begins as follows: “Gee,
I don't really know . . ." (p. 237).
b. I11 a dissonance reduction experiment involving shocks, 
Zimbardo reports that a typical confabulation would have 
been, “I guess maybe you turned the shock down” (Nisbett & 
Wilson 1977, p. 238).
c. Thalia Wheatley, one of the most inventive researchers 
using hypnotic suggestion (e.g., Wheatley & TTaidt 2005), 
reports that when she has participants perform actions under 
hypnotic suggestion, she often asks them why they performed 
the action. Although they do often confabulate, their initial 
response to the question is typically “I don't know” (T. Wheatley, 
personal communication).
I11 each of these research paradigms, we find typical confabu­
lations delivered with manifestly low confidence, rather than the 
sense of obviousness and immediacy that is supposed to be 
characteristic of introspective report.
Carrutliers also draws 011 widely cited cases of confabulation 
involving split-brain patients. And, although Carrutliers claims 
that split-brain patients confabulate with a sense of obviousness 
and immediacy, the situation is not so clear. I11 footage of split- 
brain patients, we find them showing little confidence when 
asked to explain behavior issuing from the right hemisphere.
For instance, in a typical study with split-brain patient Joe, Joe 
is shown a saw to his right hemisphere and a hammer to his 
left. Tie is then told to draw what he saw with his left hand. Pre­
dictably, Joe draws a saw. Gazzaniga points to the drawing and 
savs, “That's nice, what's that?” Saw. “Wliat'd you see?” T saw a 
hammer. “Wliat'd you draw that for?” T dunno (Hutton & 
Sametli 1988).
Carefully controlled studies are clearly needed. However, 
these anecdotes provide prima facie reason to think there are sys­
tematic differences in confidence levels between confabulation 
and apparent introspection, which in turn suggests a difference 
in underlying mechanism. The fact that confabulations are 
accompanied by low confidence does not, of course, provide con­
clusive evidence in favor of introspection. But it does suggest that 
given the present state of the evidence, the confabulation argu­
ment is toothless.
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